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Abstract 
I defend Jack Goody's approach to explaining expansive social and intellectual 
changes by pointing to the contributions of the technologies of communica-
tion, and specifically, of the use of writing (Goody 1987, 2000).  I argue that 
conceptually driven approaches to social or human kinds contribute the clari-
fications needed to alleviate and respond to his critics’ concerns surrounding 
the  notion  of  a  literate  society  (Collins  1995,  Finnegan  1999,  Sawyer  2002, 
Bloch 2003).  My defense of Goody also identifies and endorses a few main 
criteria and resources for the success of any satisfactory definition of the re-
lated notions of a literate society/literate mind. 
Keywords: Social Kinds; Social Metaphysics; Literacy Theory; Technological 
Determinism; Extended Mind Thesis. 
 
Introduction 
Regarded as one of the leading social scientists of his generation, Jack Goody is 
well-known among fellow cultural anthropologists for his having introduced 
a new paradigm of large-scale social theory which focuses on the emergence 
and evolution of the state, among other major institutions (Goody 1986, 1987, 
Pallares-Burke 2002, Olson and Cole 2006). His account associates the devel-
opment of the state, and social change more generally, to a cluster of frequent-
ly correlated technological and ecological factors that he identifies as the driv-
ers of change at the social, aggregate-level, e.g., intensive forms of agriculture, 
ensuing accumulation of surplus, urbanization, and the growth of bureaucrat-
ic institutions (Goody 2000). It is also with reference to such socio-economic or 
broader  cultural  factors  that  Goody  introduces  a  far-reaching  division  be-
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tween roughly two main types of human societies; namely, the hoe cultures of 
sub-Saharan Africa, and the plough cultures of Eurasia. As a consequence, in 
Goody’s approach, the state is construed as a cross-cultural invention, derived 
not from any particular ideological, political or territorial struggles, but rather 
common to a variety of cultures occupying, by and large, the geographies of 
Eurasia. Grounded in comparative anthropological research documenting key 
contrasts between societies of Eurasia and those of Africa, his social theory 
departs thus from the social scientific paradigm introduced by Max Weber, 
which stresses the uniqueness of Western religious, political and economic 
structures (Weber 1962).  
Goody’s commitment to explaining expansive social facts by pointing to their 
cultural  mechanisms  aligns  his  projects  with  anthropology’s  long-standing 
search for systemic patterns in the history of humanity. Specific to his work is 
his methodological emphasis on patterns of cultural transmission over long 
periods of time. He then accounts for such by looking at complex social, tech-
nological or intellectual changes he identifies as correlates --for explanatory 
purposes-- at the level of macro-sociological theory (Goody 1968, 1986, 1991). 
Goody’s position has, however, attracted intense critical responses from fel-
low anthropologists. My interest here lies in the concerns of those who have 
taken issue with his placing great weight, in his account of cultural transmis-
sion, on the contributions of the technologies of communication to both intel-
lectual and social change (Baines 1983, Street 1984, Finnegan 1988, Besnier 
1991, Halverson 1992, Street 1993, Collins 1995, Finnegan 1999, Raven 2001, 
Sawyer 2002, Bloch 2003, Finnegan 2006). Critics such as Finnegan, Street, and 
Bloch attack what they call Goody’s “literacy thesis,” or his construal of the use 
of  writing  as  a  “technology  of  the  mind”  with  crucial  implications  for  the 
growth of a society and its intellectual development. Especially when taken 
together, the critics’ arguments provide a remarkable cluster. They also lead 
to a noticeably radical conclusion: the very distinction that is presupposed by 
the literacy thesis, i.e., the distinction between oral versus literate societies, is 
scientifically unsound, and by extension, the literacy thesis itself needs to be 
discarded.  
Soon after its launch, the controversy initiated by Goody’s opponents concern-
ing  his  so-called  literacy  thesis  reached  a  standstill.  Goody  disregarded for 
quite some time the uproar he created through his emphasis on the implica-
tions of literacy for social or intellectual change. His critics pointed out that he 
did not engage in the exchanges requesting, at a very minimum, clarifications 
of his main ideas or concepts (Sawyer 2002b). When he finally provided a re-
sponse, there was little uptake left for it in cultural anthropology, and broader 
still, in literacy studies (Goody 2000).  
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Moreover, Goody’s own supporters addressed the critics’ attacks mainly by 
providing caveats to the correlations he identified in his work between, for 
instance, literate practices and religion, or literacy and the legal institutions of 
a society (Scribner and Cole 1981, Olson 2001). In addition, philosophers of 
social  science  have  been  largely  oblivious  to  the  controversy  regarding 
Goody’s literacy thesis, despite the emphasis that his critics have put on con-
ceptual, rather than empirical, reasons for rejecting the distinction between 
societies with and those without writing. However, similar conceptual con-
cerns surrounding basic distinctions among groups or social kinds introduced 
for explanatory purposes in macro-sociological theories remained at the fore-
front of philosophical investigation in gender and race studies, or broader still 
in  the  philosophy  of  social  sciences  (Ruben  1989,  Jackson  and  Pettit  1992, 
Hacking 1995, Hacking 1999, Haslanger 2000, Root 2000, Miller 2000, Sawyer 
2002a, Sismondo 2003, Saul 2006).  
I argue that recent research in social metaphysics on the distinction between 
natural kinds and social or human kinds, and, specifically, philosophical in-
vestigations supporting the special status of the latter, provide much needed 
conceptual  elucidations  of  the  role  macro-social  concepts  play  in  Goody’s 
work, and, by extension, in the debate surrounding it. Briefly, my view is that 
a more refined understanding of the metaphysics of social kinds is apt to pro-
vide philosophical support for Goody’s position. My main aim for this paper, 
however, is to defend a particular definition, or characterization, of what it is 
to be a literate society, that is consistent with, and informed by, the theoretical 
developments in the metaphysics of social kinds. In other words, I see my in-
terest in defending Goody against his critics as a stepping stone to the more 
extensive project of clarifying the prerequisites for a sound construal of the 
cognate notions of a literate society and of a literate mind, for the purposes of 
an interdisciplinary approach to literacy studies.  
After I outline Goody’s and respectively, the critics’ positions in the first two 
sections, I make a first pass at defining the notion of literate society, and then 
expand and defend my definition further against his critics’ allegations. I use 
the critics’ contentions, once clarified, to set up a series of adequacy condi-
tions that ought to be satisfied by any respectable definition of a literate socie-
ty either at the metaphysical level (in sections 3.1 and 3.2) or at the methodo-
logical level (in sections 4.1 and 4.2). This sequence of arguments will demon-
strate, I hope, that a philosophical investigation of the notion of literate society 
provides  the  conceptual  groundwork,  in  social  metaphysics,  to  macro-
sociological theory of literacy. It also opens the door for related inquiries in 
the philosophy of social sciences and the philosophy of mind and language, by 
showing that such a macro-sociological theory remains responsive to other 
approaches to literate practices and capacities.  
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1. Goody’s position under scrutiny: its main elements 
To set the stage for the controversy kindled by Goody’s macro-theory of litera-
cy, it is helpful to begin by illustrating what critics have come to call his litera-
cy thesis. I have chosen three quotations from different works by Goody. Tak-
en together, they highlight the intricacies of his approach to writing and liter-
acy, and point to the main elements of Goody’s view of writing as “a technolo-
gy of the intellect.” More specifically, they illustrate: (a) his wide-ranging in-
terest in documenting the variety of consequences that writing practices have 
for a society’s understanding and manipulating of the world, and for its social 
organization; (b) his construal of writing as a communicative practice that is 
(cognitively) different from speech, and more generally, (c) his search for com-
plex social correlates for the purposes of offering what he calls “better expla-
nations of other general theories, statements or categories” (2000, 4).  
First, here is a particularly large-scale characterization of the effects which 
a system of writing can have on a society:  
the introduction of writing helps to […] make the implicit explicit, and in 
so doing to extend the possibilities of social action, sometimes by bringing 
out tacit contradictions and thus leading to new resolutions (and probably 
new contradictions), but also by creating more precise types of transac-
tion and relationship […] that give these partnerships the strength to en-
dure in more complex, more anonymous circumstances (1986, 175). 
The generalizing tenor of his remarks here is suggestive of his aim to discover 
structural social facts concerning writing as a technology of communication, 
i.e., facts which implicate the agents’ attitudes while abstracting away from 
individual  psychological  antecedents  (Jackson  and  Pettit  1992).  But,  by  and 
large, quotes such as the above are not truly representative of his formula-
tions of the literacy thesis.  As we will see, while it is true that sometimes 
Goody is interested in large-scale generalizations, more typically, he is focused 
on the consequences of writing for a society’s understanding and manipulat-
ing of the world, and on its implications for social relations and social organi-
zation. His typical analyses are always based on ethnographic comparative 
research. They abound with illustrations and focus on degrees of differences 
between sample oral and literate societies, e.g., the religion of a particular 
literate society may have a less local focus, its legal institutions or economic 
transactions  are  more  governed  by  formal  procedures,  when  compared  to 
another particular oral society (Goody 1986, 1987).  We can thus find not one, 
but numerous, specific literacy theses in Goody’s work. This in turn suggests 
that more scrutiny is required to identify what is at stake behind his critics’ 
rejoinders.  
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Second, and contributing to the need for clarity in the formulation of his mul-
tiple  literacy  theses,  Goody  rarely distinguishes between  the  defining (even 
identifying) features of a literate society, or a literate mind, and their social or 
intellectual consequences.  But in one of his belated responses to the critics, 
cited below, Goody comes closest to providing an explication of his position, 
focusing on some core defining features of our use of writing:  
[…] Clearly all societies interpret visual signs, such as footprints, drawing 
deductions from their presence and their characteristics. Others go fur-
ther and use the lines on the palms of the hand or the marks made by mice 
in the sand as a means of prognostication. Divination in it wide range of 
forms is probably a feature of all human societies [...] It usually involves 
the interpretation of visual signs, not those made by humans but those 
specifically independent of them. Other signs, including those on Ojibway 
birch-bark scrolls, are made by humans and are usually intentional, aim-
ing to communicate to other persons. These serve as mnemonics: they do 
not systematically represent and develop speech forms in the way that a 
fully fledged system of writing does, enabling man to express in writing all 
(and at times more, but also at times less) than he can in speech. Such sys-
tems of writing, according to our view, were a major breakthrough that 
differentiates human cultures in significant ways […] (2000, 3). 
Here, the emphasis on the core features of literacy practices lies mainly at the 
end of the excerpt, where it also appears to have a programmatic force -- simi-
lar to that of a placeholder for future projects, tasked with identifying the pre-
cise  ways  in  which  human  cultures  with  writing  are  different.  More  im-
portantly, the citation provides a window into Goody’s interest in the specific 
ways in which writing systems help represent or express the content of mental 
states, and as a consequence, provide opportunities for new forms of commu-
nication and novel cognitive capacities. Goody articulates here most clearly 
his support for the idea that, at its core, the use of writing is unlike speech, 
and agents’ interpretations of writing involve some mental capacities and/or 
representations distinct from those involved in communication by means of 
other symbolic representations, including speech. As we will see in section 4.2, 
the idea of a dissimilarity between speech and writing as cognitive activities 
needs further elaboration for the purposes of adjudicating the debate with his 
critics. 
Third,  it  is  also  important  to  note  the  programmatic,  methodological  com-
ments Goody makes in his work, when he glosses over the literacy thesis as 
intended 
to shift some of the weight that has often been placed on the means and re-
lations of production to the means and relations of communication [...] By 
this I understand not only the techniques but also the technology, includ-
ing the technology of the intellect it directly permits, the libraries of accu-On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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mulated  knowledge  as  well  as  the  internal  cognitive  developments,  to-
gether with the constraints and freedoms that human beings attach to 
such systems. There has been no intention of confining analysis 
either to ‘materialist’ or to ‘ideological’ factors [...] Who nowa-
days  would  think  of  the  intellectual  products  of  the  human  hand  and 
mind, such as writing, as being purely internal or external, as relating on-
ly to matter or to ideas? (1986, 175-6, emphasis mine).  
As  he  submits,  his  interest  lies  in  new  explanatory  models  for  macro-
sociological  generalizations,  challenging  our  presuppositions  about  the  fea-
tures and locus of mental states and processes. But if writing is located both 
inside and outside the mind, its study at the macro-sociological level brings 
into  question  the  traditional  distinction  of  the  social  sciences  between  the 
macro and the micro levels of explanations, where only the latter -- but not 
the former -- deliver explanations of social facts by reference to specific psy-
chological antecedents (Jackson and Pettit 1992). It is thus worth investigating 
the extent to which the concept of literacy provides Goody’s large-scale theo-
retical projects with explanatory models which depart from established an-
thropological theorizing, in order to explore novel explanatory forms for so-
cial categories in general (2000, 2004). 
 
2. Framing the debate: Overview of the critics’ contentions 
Despite  the  programmatic  nature  of  Goody’s  interest  in  the  distinction  be-
tween oral and literate societies, and his earlier methodological comments, his 
critics regard his literacy theses as paradigmatic examples of an already estab-
lished approach to literacy which they call the “autonomous” or “technologi-
cal” perspective, to be contrasted with their preferred “ideological” construal 
(Baines 1983, Finnegan 1988, Besnier 1991). More generally, Goody’s critics 
seem to consider only two possible positions on literate societies. The first 
interprets literacy as an autonomous social phenomenon, leading to social or 
intellectual changes with almost no political or economic constraints. The sec-
ond  views  literacy as  impinging  on  a  society  only  once  it  is  valued  within 
power structures and broader social practices, such as schooling (Street 1984, 
1993, Finnegan 1999, 2003).  
Later  in  the  1990s,  the  critics’  proposed  dichotomy  between  the  so-called 
technological  and  ideological  views  of  literacy  merges  into  a  more  radical 
stance. To illustrate, following up on Besnier’s rejection of the view (attributed 
to Goody) that literacy “is a unified phenomenon” (Besnier 1991, 581), Collins 
submits that any division between oral and literate societies is improper, since 
it must depict literacy as “a uniform set of techniques and uses of language” 
(1995, 75). But the insistence to abolish the distinction between oral and lit-
erate societies appears most clearly in Finnegan’s 1999 review of literacy re-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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search in the social sciences. In this work, she insists that “practices of reading 
and writing are as much socially as technologically shaped” and that ethno-
graphic  variation  in  the  actual  practices  of  literacy  seriously  undermines 
“sweeping generalizations” in this domain. On this basis, she supports bypass-
ing the question whether there is “some potentially generalizable divide be-
tween  oral  and  literate  cultures  (or  alternatively  between  oral  and  literal 
minds or oral and literate individuals)” (Finnegan 1999).  
While most critics portray the debate as one about divergent ways of constru-
ing the very notion of a literate society/literacy, and argue against the idea of 
a distinction  between  oral  versus  literate  societies/cultures,  others,  such  as 
Bloch, articulate their concern more narrowly with the mistaken implication, 
again attributed to Goody, that writing systems as such, rather than individual 
agents’ attitudes and actions, are deemed causally efficacious (Bloch 2003). 
Such recent criticisms seem quite focused, in that they lead to straightforward 
tests of the definition of a literate society, once we are presented with some 
versions of it. Since Bloch’s concern can only be settled in light of a definition 
of the notion of a literate society, I will consider it in the concluding part of my 
response to the critics. 
I begin my reply to Goody’s critics by addressing the first cluster of concerns, 
focused on the very characterization or definition of a literate society, and the 
presuppositions behind his intended distinction between oral versus literate 
societies. The criticisms related to the injunction against any attempt to distin-
guish between societies with or without writing are not only more frequent in 
the literature, but also more radical than that of Bloch. Hence, it is imperative 
to clarify what type of rebuttal they require, and the degree to which Goody’s 
position provides the resources for such.  
The concerns in the first cluster of criticisms also appear in condensed, even 
opaque, formulations, and thus need detailed examination. To illustrate, there 
is a sense in which Besnier’s earlier allegation that Goody depicts literacy “as 
a unitary technology that [is best seen as] […] a unified phenomenon” can be 
accommodated quickly (1991, 581).  The impressive breath of Goody’s ethno-
graphic work, and his diverse, detailed characterizations of the consequences 
of literate practices for social change, provide ample textual evidence to the 
contrary (1968, 1986, 1987). As a consequence, one can reply to Besnier by 
reiterating the same basic point that the first of the three elements of Goody’s 
position has always been his identifying and documenting the variety of con-
sequences writing practices have for a society’s understanding and manipulat-
ing of the world, and for its social organization.  
However, Besnier’s allegation is ambiguous. It can be understood not merely 
as a (misguided) complaint about the lack of ethnographic specifics in Goody’s 
work, but rather as challenging Goody’s naïve expectation that social scien-
tists can readily identify and define literate practices as such. Like Street and On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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Finnegan  afterwards,  Besnier  appears to  take  Goody to  task for suggesting 
that we can define, across a multitude of social settings, social facts character-
istic  of  literate  practices  (Street  1993,  Finnegan  1999).  Given  the  skeptical 
thrust  of  these  allegations,  a  defense  based  only  on  the  three  elements  of 
Goody’s position does not seem to suffice. Rather, what is required, at the very 
least, is a more concrete definition of a literate society or a characterization of 
the type of facts that his literacy theses purport to identify, accompanied by an 
argument for why we ought to think of those facts as being social in nature.  
We also find a more radical version of Besnier’s challenge in Collins’ allega-
tions that Goody’s literacy theses commit us to a “universalist or autonomous 
literacy, seen as a general, uniform set of techniques and uses of language.” 
Following Besnier, Collins seems to question Goody’s expectation that we may 
identify cross-cultural invariants of literate practices. But he also rejects what 
he portrays, rather hastily, as Goody’s related commitment to “an essentialist, 
reified notion of literacy” (1995, 75).  
The main  thrust  of this criticism  is  clearly  directed  against  certain alleged 
metaphysical  and  methodological  pitfalls,  even  inconsistencies,  associated 
with any attempt to define literacy practices in a satisfactory way. It now re-
mains to be seen whether Goody’s position has the theoretical resources to 
deal with such criticisms, once we clarify the family of concerns expressed in 
Collins’ charge of essentialism.  
We have seen that Finnegan (1999) also advocates for the outright rejection of 
any distinction between oral and literate societies. In a later work, she also 
comes closer to rejecting Goody’s position for conceptual reasons, when she 
insists that the categories of any macro-sociological theory of literacy are too 
close to the common-sense notions of our ordinary talk about literate/illiterate 
individuals, and hence, inadequate for scientific theorizing (2003, 2006). While 
Finnegan’s later comments do not fully clarify the charge of an essentialist, 
reified notion of literacy, her criticism highlights most clearly, I think, what 
motivates  the  critics’ broader  skepticism  concerning  one’s  identification  or 
definition of a literate society. As her comments imply, the critics’ concerns 
with Goody’s work spring from a type of anguish familiar to philosophers of 
social sciences, namely whether social theorists may use, for theoretical pur-
poses, categories that are already regularly employed in common-sense social 
talk and, if so, aided by what meta-theoretical considerations. I agree with 
Finnegan’s suggestions that this type of concern needs a thorough treatment, 
and that Goody’s position does not yet provide the required meta-theoretical 
response head-on. But we can find the starting points for this in social meta-
physics, and they seem to be at least consistent with Goody’s position, or so 
I will argue. 
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In the next section, I question the critics’ earlier dichotomy between techno-
logical and ideological characterizations of literacy in order to shed light on 
an alternative definition of a literate society which is consistent with Goody’s 
own view. I argue that the definition that I will sketch provides a way out of 
a few of the critics’ concerns with its humble origins in common-sense catego-
rization. To be clear, I endorse Finnegan’s idea that the debate generated by 
Goody’s  critics  hinges  on  whether  and,  if  so,  how  we  may  utilize  folk-
categories in social/literacy studies. But I provide a reply to her critique once 
the  first  version  of  the  definition  is  tested  against  Collins’  allegations  sur-
rounding Goody’s alleged “universalized” or “essentialist” categorization. 
 
3.1. What “essence” is reified, if any, by a social theory of literacy? 
For the purposes of our argument, let us presuppose that we may find signifi-
cant textual evidence in Goody’s work for characterizations of literate practic-
es which imply what Collins calls an “essentialist, reified notion of literacy.” 
Exactly what is the worry surrounding essentialism about notions, or charac-
terizations, of literacy here? How is it related to the critics’ concern with our 
common-sensical use of notions like literate or illiterate agents? How does the 
dichotomy between technological and ideological characterizations of literacy 
provide relief, if any, to such concerns with common-sense notions of literacy 
practices? 
Let us begin with the essentialism charge voiced by Collins 1995. Typically, 
individual agents and their properties are the main potential locus of alleged 
essences (whatever the latter are). It is thus natural to explore the hypothesis 
that the critics’ concern with an essentialist notion of literacy springs from 
their  eschewing  individualistic  characterizations  of  literate  cultures,  i.e., 
which rely on properties of individual agents or objects, rather than those of 
groups.  For our purposes, ontological or metaphysical individualism is the 
stance that only individual agents exist, i.e., social objects are either elimina-
ble or reducible to combinations of the individual participants and their prop-
erties; ontological holism is the opposing view of social entities and properties 
(Ruben 1982, 1989, Sawyer 2002a). I take Collins’ concerns with essentialist 
views of literacy to mirror the critics’ opposition to any definition of literacy 
which departs from their preferred commitment to holism or collectivism in 
macro-sociological theory of literacy.  Under this reading the charge of essen-
tialism reflects what the critics perceive as Goody’s implied commitment to 
ontological individualism for the purposes of a theory of literate societies, and 
by extension, his unstable endorsement to holism.  
In its radical version, however, the critics take the same charge to suggest that 
literacy practices could only be defined at the level of individual agents, their 
(mental) properties, and/or the material objects they imagine, design and cre-On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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ate. Roughly, the charge is that any definition of literate groups would turn 
out to be reducible to features of individuals, and thus, imply (the undesira-
ble) ontological individualism. One of the reasons that such definitions fall 
prey to individualism is Goody’s uncritical adoption of the related common-
sense taxonomy which, arguably, applies naturally to individuals and not to 
groups. Then, the critics’ concern seems to be that, even after a critical analy-
sis of the ordinary categories associated with literate practices, any definition 
of literate groups remains reductively individualistic. Using this latter diagno-
sis as one of the premises of their argument, the critics seem to conclude that 
the definition of a literate society could never be adequately holistic for the 
purposes of a macro-sociological theory.
 8 Briefly, their argument can be out-
lined as a modus ponens as follows: 
P1) Any definition of literate practices/groups makes reductive reference to 
properties identified at the individual level. 
P2) If a definition of any group-based properties refers to properties of indi-
vidual agents, then it is not sufficiently holistic, i.e., not sound for the purpos-
es of macro-sociological theory. 
Hence, the definition of literate societies is not sound for the purposes of social 
macro-theory of literacy.
  
Now, an emphasis on individuals’ features is indeed present in the common-
sensical use of the classificatory distinction, adopted by Goody, between lit-
erate and illiterate agents.
 9 Furthermore, if and when extrapolated to social 
groups, this ordinary use of the terms leaves open the distinct possibility that 
the presumed social category literate society may be reduced, without much 
loss, to the set-based description of agents, each having the individual feature 
                                                             
8 It is not clear whether Goody’s critics are willing to accept that a nonreductive individualistic 
definition of literate groups satisfies their commitment to ontological holism. Sawyer explicitly 
supports such definitions in macro-sociological theory in general (2002a). His argument here is 
based on the idea that a social property is multiply realizable at the individual level, and thus 
none of the individual level states is co-extensive with it. His general argument provides indirect 
support for a nonreductive individualistic definition of literate groups, and likely, against P2 of 
the critics’ argument outlined above. But Sawyer does not consider the possibility that literacy is a 
social  rather  than  an  individual  property.  Indeed,  in  a  different  work  he  criticizes Goody  for 
having aspired to identify generalizations specific to literate groups or societies (2002b). Moreo-
ver, Sawyer’s position stresses what he takes to be methodological rather than ontological consid-
erations in support of nonreductive individualism. I believe his methodological considerations 
are broadly consistent with my proposal, but I focus first on the prospects of a holistic definition 
at the ontological, metaphysical level, and briefly discuss his methodological argument in section 
4.2, footnote 8 below.  
9 There are excerpts from Goody’s work which are ambiguous between an interpretation which 
takes literacy as defined in terms of individuals’ propositional attitude states/skills and one de-
fined in terms of properties identified at the group-level, for instance, when he characterizes the 
relevant intellectual practices as involving individuals’ subconscious application of rules of lan-
guage (Goody 1987, 265-67). AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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of being literate, just as P1 above implies. Thus any characterization of litera-
cy in terms of individual members’ properties also implies that there is noth-
ing beyond a similarity among members’ individual features that motivates 
our associating the property of being literate with the group. If so, the pro-
spects of the desired holistic definition of a literate society are faint, and, by 
extension, Collins’ concern over individualistic characterizations of literacy is 
a genuine one. But given Goody’s default commitment to holism, i.e., to identi-
fying  group-based  properties  specific  to  literate  cultures  and  societies,  not 
merely to literate agents, the threat of a reductive definition also a serious 
threat for Goody’s project.
  
In contrast, I argue against P1 above that there is both room and need for in-
terpreting the notion of a literate society as unambiguously holistic or at the 
level of social groups. I begin here by defending the plausibility of the notion 
of literate society understood as a social kind, based on a definition which 
explicitly supports the social scientists’ distinctive metaphysical commitments 
to social entities or kinds. In particular, I define a literate society as follows:  
Def. 1: L is a literate society iff members of L recognize, engage in, as-
sume, and recognize, institutionalized roles and rules governing the pro-
duction and use of texts, e.g., a social division of labour concerning train-
ing and pay for scribes, rules for identifying at the level of the community 
some individuals as librarians, editors or authors, specific terms and reg-
ulations surrounding entitlements and/or obligations implied by such in-
stitutionalized relations.
 10 
If this is correct, when we are referring to a literate society as a social kind we 
have in mind specific relations established among individual members, such 
as Saul’s being David’s scribe, and the related linguistic practice of identifying 
or characterizing such relations. But we also have in mind relations among 
individuals and certain objects they produce, preserve or use, e.g., the manu-
script records David’s speech, its being on loan to Sara, Jane being its transla-
tor, again, together with the linguistic practice identifying and characterizing 
such relations. Roughly, the first draft of the definition of a literate group ex-
plicates the distinction under attack, between literate versus oral societies or 
cultures, as one between different types of social relations, social structures or 
kinds identified linguistically by the agents. More specifically, the definition is 
holistic by paying attention  to  the  fact  that  agents  use  literacy-related  lan-
guage to designate themselves and others in socially significant ways. Agents’ 
use of literacy-specific terms, such as scribe or translator, signals that they 
                                                             
10 This definition is not inconsistent with Sawyer’s methodological nonreductive individualism. 
But it does include  features of the literate group which remain uncovered by a nonreductive 
individualistic definition, as outlined by Sawyer 2002a. Later in section 4.2, I explore briefly the 
distinction between a nonreductive individualistic definition and one that subscribes to addition-
al holistic features. On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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satisfy the institutionalized roles and are somewhat aware them in that they 
use corresponding, particular terms of their public language. The definition 
suggests thus that literacy is a relational or collecting property of individuals, 
and thus irreducibly social in nature (Ruben 1989, 19-21). 
11 
If starting with an explicitly holistic definition alleviates the concern over re-
ductive  individualism  (i.e.,  essentialism),  its  emphasis  on  institutionalized 
social relations also makes it doubtful that Goody’s literacy theses necessarily 
commit us to a “universalist […] literacy, seen as a general, uniform set of 
techniques and uses of language” (Colllins 1995). A similar response can be 
built on this working definition with regard to the alleged reification implied 
by Goody’s literacy theses. The definition focuses on social structures as the 
main entities, if any, it identifies. As a consequence, Goody or his supporters 
do not (need to) “reify” anything other than social relations established among 
individual members through their linguistic practice, and surrounding some 
special artefacts. To be more specific, Goody’s supporter may reify types of 
relations of these kinds, and define them further as sets of (tokens of) such 
socially significant relations, and thus as social structures.  
Now, it is unclear whether the critics’ alternative (“ideological”) notion of lit-
eracy is introduced in opposition to this last general commitment to various 
types  of  social  relations.
12  If  their  notion  is  expected  to  avoid  reference  to 
types of social relations, be they political or economic, then it is simply a mat-
ter of speculation as to how exactly the critics’ construal of literacy as ideolog-
ical remains faithful to their rejection of individualism in social metaphysics. 
But by itself, the proposed appeal to sets of social relations cannot weaken the 
prospects of the definition outlined above. The commitment to types of social 
relations is a stronghold of social science accounts, since the emergence of 
sociology with Durkheim’s theory of suicide, but also more recently in theo-
ries  of  subordination  based  on  race  or  gender  (Durkheim  2002  (1897), 
Haslanger 2000, Root 2000, Ruben 1998). At least by analogy with current ex-
planatory practices in the social sciences, the same idea should not be contro-
versial when applied to a macro-sociological theory of literacy.  
                                                             
11 Ruben characterizes “a property as ‘a collecting property’ not just when it is true of some indi-
viduals, but only when it is used in a socially significant way to designate those individuals […] 
a collecting property is one that is actually in use in a socially significant way to distinguish some 
persons from others, and hence as constituting an identifiable group (1989, 12).  
12 Like other supporters of the alternative ideological definition of literacy, Sawyer sees literate 
skills at the social level as correlated only with new ways of subordinating others (2002b). Sawyer 
also emphasizes that at the individual level literate skills and capacities are no different from 
those associated with verbal communication (see below section 4.2) and by extension, not associ-
ated with novel, collectively held beliefs and/or with specific linguistic practices. In section 4.1 
I focus on the need to characterize further the collectively held beliefs specific for literate groups.  AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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I  conclude  that,  without  an  additional  argument  against  any macro-theory 
which appeals to types of social relations in its explanatory hypotheses, the 
proposed definition of a literate society does provide the starting point for the 
desired distinction between oral and literate societies, just as Goody’s theses 
require. In my view the explicit reference to social kinds ought to alleviate the 
critics’ worries concerning the social scientists’ metaphysical commitment to 
an alternative to reductive metaphysical individualism. But at least because 
the first definition refers to social relations typical to literate practices, and 
especially to individuals’ own characterizations of them through public lan-
guage, more needs to be said in defense of a social definition of literacy which 
is cautious about its roots in ordinary literate taxonomies.  
 
3.2. Social metaphysics between fiction and revision of word use 
My  definition  of  literacy  as  an  irreducibly  social  type  above  implies  that 
members of literate societies categorize and discriminate among themselves 
based on their understanding and manipulation of texts in various social set-
tings. At first glance, this implication is unproblematic. It is well documented 
by  historical  research  that  categories  of  literate  practices,  such  as 
scribe/manuscript, translator/translation, author/publisher/literary work, are 
of a society’s own making. Such categories are invented by its members and 
depend  on  certain  collectively  held  bodies  of  beliefs  concerning  texts  and 
practices with them, albeit at different levels of skill or awareness (Febvre and 
Martin 1997 (1976), Stock 1983, Eisenstein 1985, 1986).  
We have seen, however, that the close affinity of Goody’s view of literacy to 
intuitive categories deployed by agents with certain commonsensical charac-
terizations of literate people has been turned on its head by his opponents. 
Collins suggest, for instance, that an essentialist (individualistic) approach to 
literacy  is  an  expected  consequence  of  common-sense  (social)  metaphysics 
since, according to him, the latter is prone to commit, all too quickly, to the 
existence of individual-based essences (1995). More radical than the criticisms 
made by Baines or Collins, Finnegan submits that the categories of literacy 
theory are accompanied by a plethora of unwanted biases, and to such an 
extent that the use of any literate categorizations as heuristic, even analytic, 
tools in the social sciences is unwarranted, if not outright objectionable. As 
she points out, the categories of literate practices are associated with a long-
standing  interest,  among  laypersons,  in  contrasting  the  worth  of  different 
people within the same society or across different cultures. For Finnegan, no 
meta-theoretical safeguards can prepare the ordinary literate categories for 
scientific use. She insists that the elitist preconceptions as well as the ethno-
centric biases – cultivated particularly by Western Europeans - related to tax-
onomies  of  literacy  practices cannot be mitigated, likely due  to the  latter’s 
irreducible link to the agents’ discriminatory use of terms such as illiterate or On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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literate.
 13 Based on this premise, she concludes that these taxonomies point to 
fictitious social facts, and thus their prospects for scientific use remain zero 
(2006).  
As  Finnegan  points  out,  terms  such as  illiterate, literate,  scribe  and  author 
have  acquired  a  deep  political  significance;  their  use  has  historically  been 
embedded in discriminatory practices in a variety of socio-economic or politi-
cal settings, leading sometimes to subordination relations. A quick reply to 
this  type  of  worry  is  that  nothing  precludes  Goody,  or any  social  scientist, 
from distancing his or her theoretical use of a term from the unfair discrimi-
natory aspects with which his or her theory may have been contingently asso-
ciated. Moreover, a critical, revisionary use of the terms can help ascertain the 
relevant discriminatory practices and request the needed political changes. To 
illustrate, a politically sensitive theory of race would still be able to document 
subjects’ using the term or the notion of race differently from one historical 
period to the other, and with different political consequences. It can also mir-
ror and even motivate changes in the subjects’ own construal of race, while 
still using the theoretical notion of race for the purposes of identifying and 
explaining the relevant social facts (Haslanger 2000, Root 2000, Miller 2000).  
But before I shall advocate a revisionary use of literate categories, let me ad-
dress Finnegan’s overarching concern with the inevitable impact of our ordi-
nary taxonomies in a social theory of literacy. The starting point of my reply 
to Finnegan is an examination of the general idea behind her argument, i.e., 
that terms and concepts with social origins and political import cannot help 
identify social facts for the purposes of a social macro-theory. As philosophers 
of social sciences have argued in other areas of social theory, the fact that so-
cial taxonomies are at least partly constructed by the persons engaging in the 
related practices does not entail that the notions involved in the subjects’ acts 
of discriminations are fictitious, and thus eliminable from our social ontology 
(Searle 1995, Martin and McIntyre 1994, Ruben 1998, Miller 2000, Haslanger 
2000). On the contrary, ordinary social classifications among people, such as 
those based on race, gender, kinship, and ethnic origin can and have been 
adopted by social scientists, at least as a heuristic prelude to social macro-
theory. As illustrated by social theories of race or gender, ordinary social cat-
egories can and have been re-drawn for the purposes of capturing systematic 
correlations  and  providing  explanations  of  social  facts,  thus  preparing  the 
ground for revisionary uses of the relevant social terms/categories (Haslanger 
2000, Saul 2006). If so, there seems to be nothing particularly suspect about 
Goody’s  having  adopted,  in  his  literacy  theory,  categories  that  are  already 
used by agents in literate societies, especially if one further refines and thus 
prepares the ordinary literate categories for scientific use.  
                                                             
13 See also Bloch 1998 for similar concerns with the alleged ethnocentric bias in literacy studies. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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However, in response to Finnegan’s main concern that the agents’ own lit-
erate categorizations shine through even their allegedly ‘purified’ deployment 
in social macro-theory, it is important to be specific about the nature of the 
subjects’ own discriminations and the roles they play in social-scientific ex-
planations. I argue that the irreducible inclusion of agents’ own discrimina-
tions is not as problematic as it may seem, although this result entails some 
changes to our working definition of a literate society. 
As another example, let us look briefly at race as a social term/notion. Refer-
ence to racial taxonomies is irreducible in a social macro-theory of race, since 
whether and how people are classified in terms of race within a society is 
shaped to a significant degree by their self-conceptions and/or whether they, 
as agents, recognize the category of race, given their non-linguistic or linguis-
tic behaviour.  This suggests more generally that social notions, such as kin-
ship, race or gender, are historical and psychological, in the sense that they 
reflect the agents having adopted a particular body of beliefs and a related 
linguistic practice over a significant period of time (Searle 1995, Hacking 1995, 
Haslanger 2000). 
But the identification of social facts about races or gender does not hang mere-
ly on agents’ individual acts of discrimination and/or on their use of the lan-
guage. To illustrate, at the level of macro-sociological theory, races are identi-
fied in terms of social facts depending also on their being forms of organiza-
tion,  institutions  which  systematically  employ  and  thereby  reinforce  racial 
taxonomies,  e.g.,  a  slave  trade,  a  segregated  school  system,  discriminatory 
hiring policies, wide differences in income levels, training and career oppor-
tunities, etc. (Searle 1995, Miller 2000). By analogy, a social theory of literacy 
points out that it is specific to literate cultures that they typically adopt public 
inscriptions as forms of communication, institute libraries or some system of 
training  or  schooling,  as  well  as  specialized  bureaucracies  (Gough  1968, 
Febvre and Martin 1997 (1976), Stock 1986, Schmandt-Besserat 2007).  
There is, then, a clear sense in which ordinary social terms and notions may 
be socially constructed at both the individual-psychological level and at the 
institutional level. But if so, it is important that the macro-sociological theory 
distinguish between the two types of social facts, and thus enable us to look 
for kinds of evidential support required for ascertaining each of them (Ruben 
1982, Searle 2006, Wilson 2007). To mirror the fact that the social theoretical 
notion of a literate society requires both types of social construction, in the 
second version of the definition, I construe the notion of a literate society as 
two-layered: 
Def. 2: L is a literate society iff (i) L members engage in, and recognize, 
institutionalized roles and rules governing the production and use of 
texts (however these are defined in material, technological terms), and 
(ii) individuals discriminate by and among themselves, based on a spe-On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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cific body of beliefs related to use of texts and reflected in their public 
language. 
This new version of the definition is faithful to Goody’s expressed interest in 
categories which help outline social facts described both inside and outside 
the mind (1986, 175-6). Albeit through a promissory note, the explicit refer-
ence to a specific body of beliefs that are adopted by individual agents stresses 
the need to identify what mental states or contents rest behind individuals’ 
acts of discrimination characteristic of literate societies. In turn, this should 
allow us to point out exactly what is irreducible and cross-cultural or, respec-
tively, what can and should be revised, if any, about their beliefs or their use 
of  language,  e.g., politically correct  or discriminatory  use  of terms  such as 
illiterate or scribe.  
Let me summarize the reply to Finnegan’s concerns. When it comes to the 
metaphysical  pedigree  of  its  related  categories  (e.g.,  writing  system,  illit-
erate/literate person), a social theory of literacy is (again) in as good a shape 
as other consecrated areas of social studies. First, the identification of social 
kinds does not hinge only on agents’ individual acts of discrimination, or on 
their common use of terms such as black, woman, or illiterate. Second, the co-
opting of these terms for theoretical purposes does not confine a social scien-
tist to the agents’ own understanding of such terms. Both race and gender 
studies have focused on identifying the relevant social kinds in order to doc-
ument institutionalized subordination, and have defended a revision of our 
ordinary use of the terms or concepts as part of a broader corrective social 
movement.  By extension, social theorists of literate practices may also be in 
a position to dissociate the meaning of the word illiterate, for instance, from 
the history of its abusive deployment, and to encourage deference to literacy 
theorists for the true reference of the terms literate or illiterate. Third, the 
prospects of a revisionary analysis of terms referring to social kinds help ad-
dress Finnegan’s concern with the alleged elitism of a social theory of literacy. 
Since such revisions require explicit definitions of the relevant social terms, 
I suggest we need more, not less focus on clarifying the proper definitions of 
our ordinary taxonomies concerning literate groups, practices or societies, as 
well as the historical benefits of a literacy-based education. 
Based on the two-layered definition introduced above, Goody’s supporters are 
also in a position to challenge the critics’ allegation that a social theory of lit-
eracy must necessarily amount to a monolithic depiction of literate practices 
(Baines  1983,  Collins  1995,  Sawyer  2002).  On the  contrary, the two-layered 
definition opens the path for more nuanced characterizations of the individu-
al, micro-level specific cognitive skills based on inter-disciplinary psychologi-
cal inquiry. For instance, the definition can accommodate cross-linguistic evi-
dence indicating that conventional notions of word are not necessarily em-
ployed by adult speakers of all languages and that, function of their different AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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literacy  skills,  their  performance  varies  for  a  range  of  segmentation  tasks 
along word-boundaries or phonemes (Hoosain 1992, Olson 1996, Homer 2009, 
Veldhuis & Kurvers 2012). But the definition can also contain further investi-
gations of the macro-level forms of institutionalized manipulations of texts, 
evidenced in a wide-range of historical research (e.g., norms or conventions 
for borrowing manuscripts and copying them in Ancient Egypt, Medieval Chi-
na or Europe, for printing dispensations in the 16
th century Europe, author 
rights or schooling policies in the 20
th century (Gough 1968, Febvre and Martin 
1997 (1976), Stock 1983, Eisenstein 1986)).  
Again, consistent  with  Goody’s  work,  our  second  definition  affords  the  de-
scription of a wide range of literate practices and cultures: oral, archaic, pre-
literate, proto-literate, restricted, emerging literate or advanced literate socie-
ties (Goody 1986). While the inclusion of such a wide range may not assuage 
all of the critics’ qualms about the so-called Western ethnocentric paradigm, 
the idea that there is a spectrum of literate cultures should at least put to rest 
their concern that once having distinguished between literate and oral cul-
tures,  literate  practices  can  no  longer  be  characterized  in  the  fine-grained 
manner as evidenced at the ethnographic level (Bloch 1998, Finnegan 1999, 
Sawyer 2002, Finnegan 2006).  
 
4.1. Which causes/agents for change in literate cultures? 
To complete my argument that there is both room and need for a social mac-
ro-theory of literacy, I now turn briefly to the critics’ contention that the no-
tion of a literate society is an improper unit of analysis due to the dubious 
type  of  explanations  which  it  affords.  For  example,  in  his  attack  against 
Goody, Bloch is particularly concerned with what he takes to be Goody’s sug-
gestion that writing systems can have social or cognitive consequences all by 
themselves, e.g., as they feature in Goody’s explanations of a society’s religion 
or system of law as influenced by its literacy practices (Goody 1968, Bloch 
2003). Similar charges of technological determinism are a recurrent theme in 
the writings of many of Goody’s critics who support the alternative “ideologi-
cal view” of literacy (Baines 1983, Street 1984, Finnegan 1988, Besnier 1991, 
Raven 2001, Sawyer 2002, Finnegan 2006).  
In  response  to  this  worry,  I  shall  now  argue,  albeit  briefly,  that  the  two-
layered definition introduced above allows us to say that the relevant causes 
are in fact located in individual agents’ body of beliefs and related institutions, 
and not in the writing systems themselves. Pace Finnegan, such explanations 
can find their home not in our everyday attempts to make sense of other peo-
ple’s lives, but likely inside social scientific accounts of various facts concern-
ing  people’s  culture  and  history.    While  a  full-blown  response  the  critics’ On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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charge of technological determinism is beyond the scope of this paper, I out-
line the main criteria and resources for the success of such a reply.  
To begin with, it is important to take note, early in the argument, of a signifi-
cant implicit constraint on the success of a defense against Bloch’s allegation. 
The reference in Goody’s preferred type of explanations of social or intellec-
tual change to causes that are specified at the individual-psychological level —
so as to eschew the charge of technological determinism— also has to steer 
one  away  from  methodological  individualism,  i.e.,  from  introducing  as  ex-
planans psychological properties intrinsic to the agents. To remain consistent 
with the argument in section 3.1 above, the favored type of explanations root-
ed in a social notion of a literate society has to bypass the appeal, for explana-
tory purposes, to causes intrinsic to the agents, for instance to merely innate 
features.  I  argue  thus  that for the cultural  anthropologist, the challenge  of 
eschewing technological determinism is a two-fold one: not only to show —as 
I try to do in this section— that agents themselves and their reasons for action 
are the intended causes of social explanations involving literate practices, but 
also that the specific body of beliefs to which these explanations allude does 
not merely concern individual agents, say, given their biological endowment 
—the goal of section 4.2. 
To begin, let us remind Goody’s critics that despite their contention, the notion 
of a literate society we are considering already includes institutional forces, 
and thereby allows, just as Goody’s empirical studies have shown, that politi-
cal, economic, andreligious influences shape the individuals’ use of writing in 
a variety ways (Goody 1968, Gough 1968). Second, and more importantly, ac-
counts of large-scale intellectual or social change which typically involve as 
explanans the use of relevant scripts or writing systems are best construed as 
short-hands for taking certain types of social relations and individuals’ related 
cognitive structures as explanans. Or if so, such accounts make irreducible 
mention of the agents’ own construal of writing systems, just as Bloch requires 
(Febvre and Martin 1997 (1976), Stock 1983, Goody 1987).  
To illustrate this construal of an explanation in terms of both (i) institutional-
ized roles and rules and (ii) certain bodies of beliefs that are specific to literate 
individuals, let us look briefly at an account of the ancient Near-East’s artistic 
output. More specifically, I focus on the dramatic intellectual transition in the 
ancient Near-East from the holistic, evocative art of the seventh millennium to 
the narrative, linear compositions exhibited on ceramic pottery, floor or wall 
paintings, or seals. As archeological studies have stressed, around 3500-3000 
B.C. in the art of the Near East, images are presented in clearly identified hori-
zontal registers, with the size and order of these images appearing to be or-
thographically and semantically structured, e.g., those placed to the right or of 
bigger sizes are of higher importance, following the boustrophedon direction 
of the script-based tables, and thus intended to be deciphered with an analyti-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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cal, linear eye [Figure 3]. In contrast, the earlier art produced in the sixth to 
fifth millennium sites (i.e., prior to the introduction of the impressed script-
based tables) is highly stylized, with compositions covering the entire circum-
ference of the vessels, and whose effect is delivered as a whole, mainly due to 
repetitious designs, and usually presented in circular or topsy-turvy patterns, 
and with no narrative composition [Figures 1 and 2]. 
 
Figure 1. Samarra vase 1  Figure 2. Samarra vase 2 
[source: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.ca/2013/04/bronze-age-writing-in-ancient-near-east.html] 
 
 
Figure 3. Uruk/Warka vase 
[source: http://www.uned.es] 
What can explain the striking similarities between the composition of paint-
ings on ceramic pottery, floor and wall paintings or the composition of carved 
seals and vases, on the one hand, and features of writing on the impressed On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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tables used  around  3500-3000  B.C.,  on  the  other  hand?  The archaeologist’s 
hypothesis is that around the time such new type of art is produced “con-
sciously or unconsciously, figures in an image were treated according to prin-
ciples similar to those governing the signs of script” (Schmandt-Besserat 2007, 
25, italics mine).  
Let us, then, take Schmandt-Besseat’s hypothesis at face value, i.e., her claim 
that that writing influenced the ancient Near East art of the third millennium 
accounts for the well-founded, fundamental differences between composition 
patterns documented quite widely and consistently during the relevant period 
of time. As a hypothesis, the idea that writing influenced art in the ancient 
Near East is mediated, and realized, by myriad types of social relations and 
individuals’ script-related cognitive structures as explanans. Specifically, the 
hypothesis is a place holder for very many individual-level event tokens, such 
as training a scribe, painting a wall, carving an impressed table for accounting 
purposes, which collectively are taken to have exerted causal powers in this 
case.  The  hypothesis  presumes  that  if  and  when  individuals  have  script-
related skills, they may regard such competencies as a source of economic 
benefit, social status, aesthetic pleasure, even self-identity or moral edifica-
tion, and thus take them up (consciously or unconsciously) as part of their 
reasons for action. While appealing to types or structures of social relations, 
the account of the emergence of linear, narrative art in the ancient Near East 
—and more generally, the social macro-theory of literacy— may still consist-
ently take the agents’ related skills as causally efficacious at the individual 
(psychological) level, contingent on a matrix of social rewards including sta-
tus,  social  disadvantages,  and  values  (Ruben  1998,  Rosenberg  2007).  Thus, 
pace  Bloch,  neither  social  structural  explanations,  nor  the  social  notion  of 
a literate society which these explanations presuppose entail a commitment to 
technological determinism.  
My reply to the kind of concern expressed by Bloch implies that structural 
explanations  of  the  type  Goody  envisages  come  with  an  important  caveat. 
Hypotheses such as that of the rise of linear narrative art are empirical claims, 
i.e., subject to the standard criteria that we use to evaluate social-scientific 
theories. Just as Goody stresses in later descriptions of his research program, 
the claim of such structural explanations is simply that, for now, the reference 
to individuals’ competencies specific to literate societies, and the types of so-
cial relations which made them possible, provide the best explanation of the 
transition to linear narrative art in the ancient Near East, as it has indeed 
been suggested by Schmandt-Besserat (Goody 2004).  
Against the background of the arguments in section 3.1 and 3.2 concerning the 
metaphysical pedigree of various literacy theses, we are also in a position to 
construe them as working empirical hypotheses, which are judged both indi-
vidually and collectively. A social macro-theory of literate societies is open to AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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empirical research in a variety of fields of investigations, from research in 
other social studies, e.g., race, gender or kinship, to archaeology, history, se-
miotics, developmental psychology or cognitive neuropsychology, as well as 
philosophy  of  mind  and  language.  This  openness  to  cross-disciplinary  re-
search  in  other fields  is also  suggestive  of  my final  defense  of Goody’s re-
search  program against methodological  individualism,  which will  complete 
my reply to Bloch.  
 
4.2. Is writing unlike speech? 
To remind, I defined the social notion of a literate society in terms of both 
institutionalized roles and rules governing the production and use of texts, 
and individuals’ acts of discriminations based on a specific body of beliefs 
related to use of texts. Even so, given my stress on the causal efficacy of indi-
viduals’ literate skills above, and the imprecise description of the specific body 
of beliefs, it is still unclear whether the individual competencies that are caus-
ally efficacious in the dynamics of a literate society are themselves intrinsic, 
i.e., innate or at least mostly biologically driven, or whether they are socially 
determined. Thus, the emphasis placed on the causal efficacy of individuals’ 
body of beliefs for the purposes of my defence of Goody against the charge of 
technological determinism, makes my position potentially vulnerable to the 
concern that it eventually succumbs to methodological individualism or es-
sentialism.  
My task, then, is to provide an account of literate cognition, or of a literate 
mind, that does justice to the following constraints: to articulate what is spe-
cific, even irreducible, about the cognitive, individual layer of the second def-
inition, but to stress that these cognitive structures are socially constructed, 
rather  than  merely  innate  or  biological,  and  thus  to  demonstrate  that  our 
sample definition of a literate society affords the interpretation of the type of 
facts identified in literacy theses as social facts.  
While Goody’s work has, for the most part, not been explicitly focused on this 
aspect of literacy theory, it nevertheless points in a fruitful direction by stress-
ing the important idea that (at the conceptual, cognitive level) writing is dif-
ferent from speech. Unlike some of his critics who emphasize that writing and 
speech are not different in kind (Sawyer 2002), his approach to writing sup-
ports the opposite view, and thereby offers the stepping stone to a fuller char-
acterization of what is irreducible about literate agents’ psychology.
14 But em-
pirical evidence for the idea that writing is unlike speech comes from a varie-
                                                             
14 The position on the cognitive status of writing is one of clearest point of discord with his critics, 
but it is only tackled by Sawyer 2002b, while it remains an important presupposition / ingredient 
of the opponents’ theory. On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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ty of sources. I will only briefly mention three lines of evidence here, in order 
to show that all of them are supportive of Goody’s position on writing, and 
fully consistent with our definition of a literate society (Harris 1986, Dehaene 
2009, Wilson and Clark 2009). 
In his account of the origins of scripts, Harris (2002) argues that the introduc-
tion of a writing system brings with it the agents’ realization that “[s]peaking 
is only one of the ways in which we can do things with words. [T]o realize that 
essential limitation of speech is precisely the hallmark of literacy” (2002, 45). 
In developing or mastering a system of writing, speakers acquire a new stance 
towards speech as human activity; they come to see it as only one possible 
realization of linguistic competence, or only one of the ways in which humans 
communicate through language. Writing seems thus to enable this new per-
spective on language mastery as multiply realizable, and thus as more ab-
stract than speech. Roughly, as Harris, Schmandt-Besserat or Olson envision it, 
the  core  element  of  the  micro-level  body  of  beliefs  specific to  members  of 
a literate practice is what they call a literate conception of language (Harris 
1986, Schmandt-Besserat 1996, Olson 2001). 
While this is not the place to expand on the idea that writing skills and mental 
structures are unlike speech in that they involve a new understanding of lin-
guistic content, it is important to note that this idea is not meant to underline 
the conceptual or cognitive superiority of literate agents, nor the historical 
teleological  status  of  any  writing  system  in  particular  (e.g.,  alphabet-based 
writing).  But  the  thesis  that  writing  is  different  from  speech  in  some  im-
portant aspects can also be further elaborated and supported by empirical 
psychological research on literacy-related skills, both in developmental psy-
chology and in neuro-psychological accounts of the effects of reading on the 
brain (Olson 2001, Tolchinsky 2003). As Dehaene stresses, our learning the 
specific rules for writing a variety of languages is constrained by our brain 
architecture, and exploits the plasticity of our visual system, through a mech-
anism he calls neuronal recycling. According to his neuro-psychological ac-
count, the evolution of scripts can be interpreted as a long-term cultural effort 
to make writing “fit” for being able to invade the information-processing ca-
pabilities of our visual system (Dehaene 2009). But if so, literate skills have 
a cultural and neuro-psychological basis that is different in important aspects 
from the innate language faculty posited to explain the acquisition of our abil-
ity to produce and understand speech (Chomsky 1988).
  
Furthermore,  Goody’s  emphasis  on  the  distinction  between  writing  and 
speech can also be naturally developed along the lines of the following hy-
pothesis in the philosophy of mind, inspired by the extended cognition model 
of the mind: tokens of writing systems are not merely among the causes of 
literate skills, not merely their triggers, but literally constitutive of our literate 
cognitive skills and practices (Wilson and Clark 2009, Theiner 2011). Accord-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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ing to this conceptually driven reasoning, certain cognitive capacities that are 
made  possible  by  writing  are  thus  by  their  very  nature  socio-cultural, 
i.e., their  physical  manifestation  includes  not  only  mental  processes  and 
events inside an individual’s head but also a suite of bio-externally located 
representations, just as Goody intended.  
To conclude, equipped with a refined version of the thesis that writing is dif-
ferent  from  speech,  various  literacy  theorists  can  address  Bloch’s  concern 
with  technological  determinism.  Under  this  approach  the  supporter  of  the 
social definition of the notion of a literate society does not fall prey to the 
methodological individualism (or biological essentialism), as this is often sug-
gested in literacy studies.
 15 At the same time, it also refutes Bloch’s claim that 
“tools do not alter [agents’] purposes”(2003, 101).  
 
Conclusion 
To summarize, in the last part of the paper, I have argued that, of the three 
main elements of Goody’s view of writing as “a technology of the intellect,” the 
first two are empirical hypotheses, and should thus be assessed not for their 
alleged conceptual failings, but rather for issues having to do with their ex-
planatory success and corroboration with other empirical hypotheses.
16 Argu-
ably, since the social definition of the notion of literate society passes the tests 
implied by his critics’ arguments, it can also provide the basis for a sound 
evaluation of any counter-examples to applied, specific literacy theses, such as 
that by Schmandt-Besserat outlined above.  
My conception of the notion of literate society also suggests that social macro-
theory of literacy ought to be informed by research on literate practices in 
fields which are traditionally not considered relevant to literacy theory prop-
er. Both empirical research on literate skills in fields such as archeology, cog-
nitive psychology, and conceptually driven inquiry in social metaphysics and 
philosophy of mind and language contribute to the debate. By pursuing this 
more  radically  interdisciplinary  approach,  one  can  hope  to  test  further 
Goody’s  visions  for  social theory,  and those  of  his  critics.  However,  I have 
                                                             
15 In my  view, the characterizations of writing-based  cognition reviewed in this section imply 
a stronger approach to the social nature of literacy than the one suggested by Sawyer’s methodo-
logical nonreductive individualism. As a consequence of our cognitive limitations, and broadly of 
our human nature, we do not develop literate skills and the accompanying abstract conception of 
language unless we construct, in a social setting, the technology required for representing core 
features of our language faculty. At least to reflect this feature of literacy accurately, I would 
argue that we need an ontological position on it, and a holistic one to boot. 
16 As outlined in section 2, the first two elements of Goody’s position are (a) his theses concerning 
the variety of consequences writing practices have for a society’s understanding and manipulating 
of the world and (b) his construal of writing as a communicative practice (cognitively) different 
from speech.  On Goody, his critics, and beyond: Social metaphysics for literacy studies 
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tried to show that we can safely put to rest the critics’ attack against the social 
notion of a literate society Goody’s position presupposes. 
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